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Abstract 
As part of the rise of a worldwide corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement, companies 
have increasingly incorporated social and environmental concerns into their policies. This paper 
examines the extensiveness of these policies, proposing that an underappreciated contributor is 
the degree of organizational boundary spanning. The paper is novel in integrating multiple types 
of boundary spanning into a single empirical framework, including product, sub-unit, and 
national boundary spanning. The paper adds complexity to the literature by theorizing that 
different types of boundary spanning associate with CSR policy extensiveness in different issue 
areas. The results show that product spanning associates with CSR policy extensiveness in the 
area of consumers, sub-unit spanning in the areas of workers, and nation-state spanning in all 
issue areas. A unique, comprehensive, and global dataset of 2,714 prominent consumer goods 
companies in the Goodguide database underpins these findings.  
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Three Types of Organizational Boundary Spanning: 
Predicting CSR Policy Extensiveness Among Global Consumer Products Companies 
 
Company policies are significant objects of management research, not only as technical materials 
that codify internal practices, but also as symbolic structures that articulate the priorities, 
identities, and values of organizations to external audiences (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In recent 
decades, particularly with the rise of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement 
(Waddock, 2008), company policies have increasingly addressed social issues, such as those 
related to workers (Nie, Lämsä, & Pučetaite, 2018), human rights (Renouard & Ezvan, 2018), 
consumers (Villa Castano, Perdomo-Ortiz, Duenas Ocampo, & Duran Leon, 2016), supply 
chains (Oka, 2018), and the natural environment (Baranova & Meadows, 2017). Policies on 
these issues are now ubiquitous on company websites, throughout dedicated CSR reports, and 
even in annual financial disclosures (Bromley & Sharkey, 2017). Indeed, the widespread 
diffusion of corporate social policies is the backdrop to a sharp criticism of the CSR movement – 
that companies have engaged in CSR merely by changing their policies, rather than by changing 
their actual business practices. 
 
Notwithstanding this increased recent attention to CSR, companies still differ remarkably in their 
CSR policies. As for contemporary examples of these differences, Walmart extended its policies 
in early 2018 to cover paid family leave – a privilege enjoyed by less than 15 percent of private-
sector American workers.1 Citigroup’s published code of conduct, detailing many of its ethical 
                                                        
1 http://fortune.com/longform/us-family-leave-parental-leave-activists/ 
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policies, runs over 18,000 words,2 whereas Boeing’s fits onto a single page.3 Both Amazon and 
Apple recently received shareholder proposals to adopt policies to promote board gender 
diversity, with Amazon acceding to new protocols but with Apple resisting and ultimately 
prevailing in the shareholder vote.  
 
As practical justification for studying CSR policies, we note that their adoption may contribute to 
long-term positive social impacts, despite criticisms that many CSR policies are little more than 
window dressing (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Hawn & Ioannou, 2016). “Moral entrapment” 
(Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012) or the “paradox of empty promises” (Hafner-Burton & 
Tsutsui, 2005) are notions that even token commitments to CSR policies can give stakeholders 
the leverage to hold companies accountable. When CSR policies among companies reach a 
critical mass, a willingness and capacity on the part of businesses to address progressive social 
issues may be signaled to governments, potentially leading to the emergence of mandatory 
regulations (Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999). Lastly, since CSR policies are a fairly 
objective and generally publicly available indicator of business’ CSR engagement, these policies 
are often key components of CSR ratings schemes, which may have tangible consequences for 
companies, especially when these ratings are consulted by investors in constructing portfolios 
and consumers in making purchasing decisions (Flammer, 2013). In short, by analyzing the 
factors that lead to the adoption of CSR policies, we may achieve greater understanding of the 
factors that ultimately bring about positive social changes. 
 
                                                        
2 http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/data/codeconduct_en.pdf 
3 http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/principles/ethics_and_compliance/pdf/english.pdf 
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As for theoretical contributions, we focus in this paper on CSR policy extensiveness, a concept 
that has been developing only recently in the CSR literature. CSR policy extensiveness refers to 
the range of “different categories of environmental and social information” that are addressed by 
company policies, rather than just the mere presence or absence of a CSR policy that covers a 
single issue area (Cho, Exeter, & Patten, 2015, p. 2). CSR policy extensiveness recognizes that 
companies have recently increased their CSR engagement not only in depth, but also in breadth 
(Heikkurinen & Forsman-Hugg, 2011; Yusoff, Mohamad, & Darus, 2013), not only in scale, but 
also in scope (Sethi, Martell, &  Demir, 2017, p. 800; Grosbois, 2012). Studying CSR 
extensiveness answers calls to approach CSR as an “umbrella” or “fundamentally 
multidimensional” construct that encompasses a variety of issue areas (Costa & Menichini, 2013; 
Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017, p. 919 Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016, p. 261).  
 
More specifically, we analyze whether companies have wide-ranging CSR policies across the 
areas of workers, consumers, human rights, supply chains, and the natural environment. As for 
the validity of these particular issue areas, we note that they have underpinned much theoretical 
(Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016) and empirical work (Bair, 2017; Bansal, Gao, & Qureshi, 2014; 
Groza, Pronschinske, & Walker, 2011; Karp, 2015; Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009). These 
issue areas are standard dimensions of ratings frameworks like CSR-S Monitor (Sethi et al., 
2017) and KLD Analytics (Capelle-Blancard & Petit, 2017), of principles-based CSR 
frameworks like the UN Global Compact (Wynhoven & Stausberg, 2010), of standards-based 
frameworks like the ISO 26000 (Hahn, 2013), and of transparency-based frameworks like the 
Global Reporting Initiative (Toppinen & Korhonen-Kurki, 2013). 
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As a second theoretical contribution, we argue that a significant factor for understanding the 
degree of CSR policy extensiveness is organizational boundary spanning. Organizational 
boundary spanning is the spread of an organization across multiple institutionalized domains, 
which are “complex, socially constructed and negotiated entities that have fundamental effects 
on organizational life” (Heracleous, 2004, p. 96), including such boundaries as those that 
separate company sub-units (Teigland & Wasko, 2003), product categories (Leung & Sharkey, 
2013), and national borders (Schotter, Mudambi, Doz, and Guar, 2017). We note here that many 
forms of boundary spanning appear to be on the rise among organizations, with research showing 
the increasing spread of organizations across national borders (Pope & Meyer, 2015) and the 
advent of new organizational designs to manage a multiplicity of sub-units (Roberts 2007). Our 
attention to organizational boundary spanning contrasts with the dominant tendency in the CSR 
literature to view organizations as more or less singular entities that are well described by such 
attributes as size and headquarter country (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). The idea of 
organizational boundary spanning, rather, answers calls to introduce complexity into the study of 
CSR, portraying organizations as inherently heterogeneous entities that must be managed and 
coordinated across multiple internal and external boundaries (Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016, p. 273; 
Aggerholm & Trapp, 2014; Vashchenko, 2017; Vaz, Fernandez-Feijoo, & Ruiz, 2016). In 
theorizing a relationship between organizational boundary spanning and CSR policy 
extensiveness, we consolidate prior work by integrating three different types of boundary 
spanning into a single empirical study. While the literatures on sub-unit, product, and nation 
spanning have continued to deepen, they are seldom conjoined or related to the outcome of CSR 
policy extensiveness. 
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In connecting and further developing these literatures, we posit a relationship between CSR 
policy extensiveness and organizational boundary spanning that is not general, but contingent. 
Rather, we theorize that boundary-spanning organizations have both incentives and disincentives 
to formalize CSR policies. On the one hand, policy formalization may bring efficiencies from 
standardization, may coalesce a larger organizational identity, and may signal the organization’s 
values to external audiences. On the other hand, extensive CSR policies may have the 
disadvantage of limiting the autonomy and flexibility of boundary-spanning organizations’ sub-
units and business segments (Newton, Ewing, & Collier, 2014; Orton & Weick, 1990). 
Cognizant of these opposing forces, we propose that the relationship between boundary spanning 
and CSR policy extensiveness may depend on the specific type of boundary spanning, which 
may engender policy formalization only in specific CSR issue areas. 
 
Turning to our data component, we present the first analysis of comprehensive, cross-national 
measures of the CSR policy extensiveness of 2,714 consumer products companies in the 
“GoodGuide” database.4 This database covers the full population of companies whose products 
are purchased by a large cross-section of the global consuming public and for whom CSR 
engagement is likely to be a salient concern. We construct our main independent variables from a 
wide range of data sources to build scales that aggregate various dimensions and types of 
organizational boundary spanning. After describing methods and presenting results, our paper 
ends by reviewing major theoretical contributions and discussing practical implications for the 
substantive area of corporate social responsibility.   
 
                                                        
4 http://www.goodguide.com/about. 
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Corporate Social Policy: The Institutionalization of CSR within Companies 
 
Corporate social responsibility is the notion that businesses, in addition to profits, should seek 
positive social and environmental impacts (Davis, Whitman, & Zald, 2008). CSR has come to 
encompass ideas that companies should abide by widely held social norms, respect the traditions 
and needs of host communities (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2015), and oftentimes voluntarily go 
beyond legal compliance to adopt discretionary pro-social programs and practices. More broadly, 
CSR is thought to serve as a corrective to prevailing notions of economic neoliberalism in which 
businesses benefit the commonweal simply by pursuing stockholder interests, obviating the need 
for companies to engage in dedicated, voluntary, and extra-legal pro-social actions (Friedman, 
1970).  
 
Company policies are documented sets of broad guidelines that inform companies’ responses to 
future situations, while directing and restricting the plans, decisions, and actions of employees in 
the achievement of corporate objectives (Epstein, 1987).5 Corporate social policies serve to 
incorporate CSR principles into formal or official materials, tending to render businesses’ 
commitments to CSR as a matter of public display and, presumably, private practice (Epstein, 
1998). As CSR policies are often adopted after much explicit deliberation, they are generally 
indicative of the degree to which specific sets of social ideas, norms, and practices have been 
rationalized in a company. Overall, policy adoption may be viewed as a specific type of CSR 
                                                        
5 This definition draws language from the “corporate policy” entry in the online Business Dictionary 
(www.businessdictionary.com). 
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action through which businesses socially construct their organizational identities, clarify their 
values, and standardize specific social and environmental practices (Scott & Lane, 2000).  
 
The widespread diffusion of CSR policies in recent decades represents a new era in a movement 
that was initially met with much resistance. Supporting the claim that CSR has transitioned from 
“heresy to dogma” (Hoffman, 2001), tens of thousands of companies today endorse social 
policies in their official documents. One prominent example is the dramatic rise in business 
signatories to the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, which in recent years included more 
than 10,000 businesses across 170 countries, with each signatory committing to principles 
ranging from collective bargaining to environmental sustainability (Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). Other 
well-documented examples include the spread of CSR-themed mission statements (Verboven, 
2011) and the incorporation of CSR principles in corporate by-laws in response to shareholder 
resolutions (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Helping to explain the increasing extent to which 
companies appear to be formalizing their CSR commitments are recent surveys of business 
leaders across dozens of countries and industries, which report widespread belief that CSR can 
assist in traditional business goals such as enhanced corporate reputation, lower capital costs, or 
better employee recruitment and retention (e.g., Accenture, 2013). Reflecting these widespread 
beliefs, CSR policies in the contemporary period are no longer confined to particular countries, 
regions, or industries, but have become international and pan-industry in scope (Christmann, 
2004). 
 
 
Corporate Social Policy Extensiveness and Organizational Boundary Spanning 
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CSR policy extensiveness is the extent to which companies’ policies encompass many social 
issue areas. The concept is much overlooked in extant empirical work that focuses on business 
practices rather than the company policies that presumably shape those practices to begin with. 
In the large scholarship on corporate social performance, for example, scholars seek to 
understand why some companies have better social impacts than others (Waddock & Graves 
1997). Even where the CSR literature attends to policies, more emphasis oftentimes remains on 
practices. This is apparent, for example, in the numerous studies on policy-practice decoupling 
(Westphal & Zajac, 2001), which propose that companies adopt CSR policies for legitimacy 
reasons but fail to implement them to preserve operational autonomy (Lim & Tsutsui 2012). 
 
Studies that directly address CSR policies consist mostly of diffusion studies of single policies, 
rather than analyses of the extent to which companies adopt numerous CSR policies across a 
variety of issue areas (Pope & Lim, 2019). This scant attention to CSR policy extensiveness 
seems mismatched to the construct of CSR, which is now understood to be an umbrella term that 
subsumes a litany of social issues (Dahlsrud, 2008). Framing the extensiveness of companies’ 
CSR policies also seems increasingly warranted given that there are many companies that have 
now committed themselves to an assortment of CSR issues, some of which seem unrelated to 
their core technical operations. Nike Inc., for example, a leading global seller of athletic apparel, 
has recently used television commercials to advertise its commitment to a host of social issues, 
including gender equality, racial injustice, and religious tolerance (Ladd, 2018). As additional 
illustration of the idea that CSR is a highly polysemic construct, the evaluation schemes that 
assign companies CSR performance scores do so by amalgamating sub-scores in an array of CSR 
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dimensions (Mattingly, 2017). In sum, companies are likely to realize the full CSR construct 
only to the extent that they address themselves to a spectrum of social issues. 
  
As a main theoretical contribution, we suggest that a significant predictor of CSR policy 
extensiveness is the degree of company boundary spanning – the spread of a company across 
institutionalized domains (Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016; Mellahi et al., 2016). Our focus on 
boundary spanning contrasts with the existing CSR literature. Researchers most commonly 
predict CSR from singular company characteristics, such as size, age, visibility, industry, and 
headquarter nation (e.g., Blombäck and Wigren 2009). A focus on boundary spanning, by 
contrast, does not conceptualize companies as singular but as constituted by a multiplicity of 
internal and external environments. In our paper, we integrate three different types of boundary 
spanning into the same empirical model – the spanning of sub-units (Teigland & Wasko, 2003), 
products (Leung & Sharkey, 2013), and nations (Schotter et al. 2017). We identify these types 
from a broader literature on boundary spanning whose attentions to CSR are very much 
underdeveloped (Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016). Our baseline expectation is that all three types of 
boundary spanning lead to more extensive CSR policies, although we also raise the novel 
argument that different types of boundary spanning have stronger effects on CSR policy 
extensiveness in specific social issue areas. 
 
Indeed, we suggest that an overall connection between boundary spanning and CSR policies is 
not a foregone conclusion. Rather, the relationship may be subject to opposing forces. On the one 
hand, boundary-spanning organizations may increase CSR policy extensiveness at the corporate 
level, rather than retaining informal approaches among various sub-units and business segments, 
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in order to gain efficiencies from standardization (Christmann, 2004; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001). Organizations spanning an array of products, sub-units, or nations may also use extensive 
CSR policies to coalesce or signal a pro-CSR organizational identity (Gössling & Vocht, 2007) 
that appeals to their various stakeholders, including workers (Gubler, Larkin, & Pierce, 2017), 
consumers (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004), and regulators (Kinderman, 2012). The various 
industrial and geographic audiences that companies span, while having their own distinct 
preferences and tastes (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Levina & Vaast, 2005), may nonetheless 
respond well to organizations that position their identity around widely held social values that 
transcend local settings (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Kislov, 2014; Kislov, Hyde, & 
McDonald, 2017). These logics imply that the adopted CSR policies are extensive: narrow or 
limited CSR policies may not be sufficient to project the desired organizational identity or to 
choreograph business practices. 
 
On the other hand, the institution of extensive company-wide CSR policies is likely to come with 
costs (Kiron et al., 2015; Sprinkle & Maines, 2010). Such policies may preclude various 
organizational sub-units and operating segments from developing their own individualistic and 
informal approaches (Newton et al., 2014). Companies with extensive CSR policies may have 
less autonomy and flexibility to be responsive in ambiguous or fluctuating operational 
environments (Perrow, 1967; Brunsson, 1990). Indeed, due to these pressures, critics have 
suggested that even official CSR policies are oftentimes decoupled from everyday practices so 
that organizations can protect their operational core from nontechnical social influences 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012). As for organizational identity, companies with high boundary 
spanning may wish to avoid integrating themselves around widely held “hyper-norms” (Huemer, 
 12 
2010) that may strike their various business segments as overly generic (Fleming & 
Waguespack, 2007; Levina & Vaast, 2005). Indeed, due to the contemporary widespread 
involvement of companies in CSR, some have argued that CSR may have lost its ability to 
distinguish companies from their competitors (Dowling & Moran, 2012; Peloza, Loock, Cerruti, 
& Muyot, 2012). 
 
Given these two opposing logics, it is not clear that boundary spanning either enhances or 
inhibits the formalization of extensive CSR policies. We further discuss these logics below in 
sections that introduce particular types of boundary spanning. 
 
 
Sub-unit Spanning 
 
Research has long recognized that boundary spanning occurs within organizations (e.g., Teigland 
& Wasko, 2003; Alexander, Teller, & Roggeveen, 2016). Sub-unit spanning, more specifically, 
refers to the spread of organizations across multiple units that fall under a single formal 
organizational structure, such as subsidiaries, branches, and franchises (Daft, 1992; Simon, 1996; 
Kang, 2013). Managers of complex structures of sourcing, production, and distribution may have 
an incentive to formalize extensive policies because separate or inconsistent approaches across 
business units will not benefit from economies of scale (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Lucea & 
Doh, 2012). More extensive policies may permit tighter governance at the corporate level as a 
means to integrate, coordinate, and control various sub-units (Acquier, Valiorgue, & Daudigeos, 
2017; Christmann, 2004). On the other hand, sub-unit spanning companies may forego extensive 
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CSR policies in order to give their sub-units more operational flexibility when dealing with 
emergent issues in heterogeneous operating environments. Research on organizational design, 
for example, has long recognized that organizations are systems that can benefit from the “loose 
coupling” of sub-units rather than their tight integration through policy standardization (Weick, 
1976). As a simple example, a school might allow its classrooms to formulate their own 
approaches to homework, testing, and curriculum so that its teachers can be more responsive to 
the needs of their particular students. There may be similar benefits from loose coupling for 
companies with many subsidiaries that are characterized by volatile labor (Fisch & Zschoche, 
2012) and economic conditions (Chung, Lee, Beamish, & Isobe, 2010). While there are opposing 
forces at play, our hypothesis here and further below is that the greater complexity of boundary 
spanning companies leads to a higher baseline need to integrate sub-units through greater policy 
extensiveness:   
 
H1a: Companies with greater sub-unit spanning have greater CSR policy extensiveness. 
 
 
While sub-unit spanning may lead to CSR policy extensiveness in general, it may have a larger 
effect on some policy types. In particular, as sub-units are internal to organizations, sub-unit 
spanning may have larger effects in increasing the extensiveness of policies related to internal 
stakeholders, namely workers. Other policy types, by contrast, including those related to supply 
chains, consumers, and the natural environment, implicate entities or stakeholders that are 
external. As illustration of the content of worker policies, they may express the organizational 
position on such matters as job security, unionization, and employee healthcare. Worker policies 
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may also intertwine with employee ethics, addressing such matters as whistleblowing and sexual 
harassment (Chughtai, Byrne, & Flood, 2015; Kalshoven & Boon, 2012; Prottas, 2013). 
 
It is true that worker policies may yield returns even for companies with limited sub-unit 
spanning. Presumably all companies may have better employee recruitment, for example, from 
the institution of progressive policies on such matters as work-life balance and maternity leave 
(Turban & Greening, 1997). Similarly, all companies might find that such policies cause 
employees, once onboard, to have higher retention and productivity (Gubler, Larkin, and Pearce, 
2017). Other potential benefits, as well, such as the belief that work is more meaningful, may be 
available to companies that adopt extensive worker-related CSR policies, whether or not these 
companies have high degrees of sub-unit spanning (De Roeck, Akremi & Swaen 2016).  
 
That said, these benefits may be more salient for companies with workforces dispersed across 
multiple sub-units. Companies with employees across many functional silos may be particularly 
drawn to policies that raise their esprit de corps (Verbos, Gerard, Forshey, Harding, & Miller, 
2007). Such companies may also have an outsized need to lubricate their internal labor market by 
ensuring that workers enjoy the same CSR protections throughout various organizational sub-
units (Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999). Increasing workers’ identification with the company, 
which may foster trust and limit internecine competition, is another benefit that may be 
especially attractive to sub-unit spanners (Ashforth, Rogers, & Corley, 2010). Lastly, having 
worker-related policies may provide legal protection in the event of a major ethical breach, an 
occurrence that may be more difficult for sub-unit spanners to avoid or anticipate due to their 
greater complexity (Child & Rodrigues, 2011). Thus, even though there appears to be a general 
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business case for all companies to adopt extensive worker-related CSR policies, the case may be 
especially strong for sub-unit spanners. 
 
H1b: Companies with greater sub-unit spanning have greater CSR policy extensiveness 
in the area of workers. 
 
 
Product Spanning 
 
Another form of boundary spanning is the spread of organizations across products (Baumann-
Pauly, Scherer, & Palazzo, 2016). As different product domains are likely to have their own set 
of competitive dynamics, coercive forces from regulatory bodies, and normative influences from 
professional, credentialing, and consumer associations (Calzolari, 2016; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), product spanners are likely to grapple with much 
operational heterogeneity. In doing so, product spanners may deliberate on the benefits and 
drawbacks of integrating their product divisions through the institution of extensive company-
wide CSR policies. 
 
On the one hand, product-spanners may gain flexibility to deal with the particular fluctuating 
demands of their various product divisions by limiting CSR policy extensiveness. Product 
spanners may become isomorphic with disparate industry-level expectations by allowing their 
product divisions to formulate their own approaches that align more closely with local standards 
(Koivupalo, Sulasalmi, Rodrigo, & Väyrynen, 2015). As a simple example, a company with a 
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high degree of unrelatedness in its product diversification, such one that sells both coffee and 
nuclear power, may find it too onerous to commit its coffee division to the high standards of 
transparency and environmental protection that are expected of its nuclear power division. On 
the other hand, there are also potential benefits from extensive company-wide policies. In 
particular, McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 123) have argued that “there are economies of scope 
in the provision of CSR, or cost savings that arise from the joint production of CSR 
characteristics for several related products.” These benefits have some empirical backing. Xu & 
Liu (2017), for example, find that product diversification is associated with higher CSR 
investments. The potential efficiency incentives for creating extensive CSR policies that are 
shared across product divisions motivate our baseline hypothesis below. 
 
H2a: Companies with greater boundary spanning across products have greater CSR 
policy extensiveness. 
 
Product spanning is also likely to have an external dimension, encompassing the spread of 
organizations across consumers. Consumers, as well, have been a focal point of CSR 
discussions, with much recent attention to issues such as consumer privacy, product safety, 
ethical advertising, and product labeling (Castaldo et al., 2009). Consumers are often segmented, 
not only by product types but also by product characteristics such as price, quality, functionality, 
and style. Companies with high product spanning may realize efficiency gains by centralizing 
consumer relations in communications or marketing departments that develop and oversee 
company-wide policies. Procter & Gamble, PepsiCo, Unilever, and Coca-Cola, for example, are 
companies that own dozens of brands and which have highly professionalized marketing 
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departments. To the extent that product-spanning companies respond to these incentives by 
becoming leaders in consumer responsibility, they may realize, not only efficiency gains, but 
also branding benefits. As CSR has become a broad-based consumer preference (Bhattacharya & 
Sen, 2004), it may bring about such benefits as greater consumer loyalty and increased 
willingness to pay (Polonsky & Jevons 2009). 
 
H2b: Companies with greater boundary spanning across products have greater CSR 
policy extensiveness in the area of consumers. 
 
   
Nation Spanning 
 
Our last form of boundary spanning is across national institutional environments, capturing the 
extent to which companies have operations in multiple countries (Schotter et al., 2017). Nation 
spanning may implicate large cultural differences in linguistic, political, economic, familial, 
ethical, and religious heritage (Shin, Hasse, & Schotter, 2017). Nations also tend to have 
distinctive legacies in regard to how businesses relate to workers, governments, and broader 
society (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). Due to these differences, worldwide variability in CSR 
may be explained partially by the evolution of CSR within preexisting national systems (Matten 
& Moon, 2008).  
 
Host and home governments of nation spanners may be sensitive to criticisms that these 
companies have moved abroad to exploit lax labor regulations, seek out “pollution havens” (He 
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2006), or truck away the natural resources of local communities. Nation spanners may therefore 
use extensive CSR policies to signal to these governments a commitment to higher norms that 
transcend nationally-specific cultures (Attig et al., 2016; Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). Research on 
“world society,” for example, has shown that CSR has become an increasingly valued concept 
within the global polity and within the international network of nongovernmental organizations 
(Meyer, Pope, & Isaacson, 2015). As such, by signaling their commitment to “international 
rules,” companies may “acquire a ‘passport’ to the international market” (Gugler & Shi, 2009, p. 
7). 
 
If CSR policies are signals, the strength of these signals may be increased by formalizing 
extensive policies that detail commitments to a variety of CSR issue areas. Few policies may not 
serve well for securing international access in the present context of pervasive apprehension that 
companies are engaging with CSR only superficially (Bromley & Powell, 2012). This process of 
signaling may also be subject to competition. Presumably many other companies will seek to use 
their policies to display commitments to a broad variety of CSR concerns in order to compete for 
international contracts and access (Leonardo, Federico, & Nazaria, 2011). Competition of this 
sort may generate a virtuous cycle whereby CSR policies become more inclusive over time of a 
variety of CSR policy dimensions. 
 
H3a: Companies with greater nation-state spanning have greater CSR policy 
extensiveness. 
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Nation spanners may be particularly likely to formalize policies in the specific areas of human 
rights and supply chains, two issues whose discourses have been especially international in scope 
(Bair, 2017; Karp, 2015; Lim & Tsutsui, 2012; Soundararajan & Brown, 2016). Human rights, 
including the right to life, family, shelter, and freedom of thought,6 are thought to be independent 
of country or “universal.” Scholars of international law have begun to consider non-state actors, 
such as corporations, as themselves having obligations to advance and enforce human rights 
norms (Clapham 2006; Wynhoven & Senne, 2004). As such, companies may formalize their 
commitments to human rights to increase the external legitimacy of their entry into states where 
human rights are considered to be less respected or developed. 
 
Supply chain discourses, as well, mostly implicate companies that are operating across national 
borders (Bair, 2017). The notion of supply chain monitoring, for example, often suggests that 
companies have an obligation to hold their overseas partners to standards that may be higher than 
what exists in the foreign regulatory context. Formal supply chain policies may protect 
internationally diversified firms from reputational crises that stem from difficult-to-predict lapses 
in the behavior of their disparate foreign partners (Minor & Morgan, 2011). Conversely, 
companies that operate within the boundaries of a single country may see little functional need or 
signaling benefit from extending policies related to globally oriented issues such as supply 
chains or human rights. 
 
H3b: Companies with greater nation-state spanning have greater CSR policy 
extensiveness related to human rights and supply chains. 
                                                        
6 See the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
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Data and Methods 
 
The firm-level scores of CSR policy extensiveness utilized in this paper were calculated from 
data that were manually extracted in January 2016 from GoodGuide,7 a web-based platform that 
provides assessments of the social and environmental impacts of global consumer goods and 
their producers. Established in 2007 by Dara O’Rourke,8 an environmental and labor-policy 
professor at U.C. Berkeley, who has conducted extensive research on sustainability, supply 
chains, and many other CSR issues (O’Rourke, 2003, 2004, 2005), the database has two major 
strengths in our estimation. First, it has comprehensive coverage of companies involved in the 
manufacture and distribution of a diverse range of consumer goods, including personal care, 
household chemicals, food, pet food, lighting, home appliances, cell phones, and car products. 
As an inclusion criterion, companies in the database comprise the top 80 percent of sales in their 
respective product categories. Nearly all global household names appear in the database, such as 
Coca-Cola, Samsung, BMW, Google, and Facebook, although a larger share are smaller 
enterprises with lower public profiles such as Acura Pharmaceuticals and African Red Tea 
Imports. Companies in the GoodGuide database include 51 percent of the top 500 companies by 
                                                        
7 In recent years, GoodGuide has stopped publishing company-level policy scores to focus on product-level 
responsibility. The data used in this paper can be retrieved from the Wayback Machine, an internet archive, by 
searching for “www.goodguide.com/companies” and navigating to the early months of 2016. 
8 Much of Dara O’Rourke’s expertise with CSR and sustainability issues stems from his research and consulting 
experience at various institutions, including a PhD and MS from U.C. Berkeley, a professorship at MIT, consulting 
for the World Bank and United Nations Environment Programme, and currently as a Senior Principal Scientist with 
Amazon (see http://www.daraorourke.com/about). 
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revenue in the Compustat North American database and 45 percent of the same category of 
companies in the Compustat Global database.9 
 
Second, GoodGuide’s social policy scores have a broad coverage of social issue areas. The 
indicators at the most granular level allow the calculation of policy-coverage scores for the sub-
dimensions of the natural environment, workers, human rights, consumers, and supply chains. 
Many of these dimensions are common in other CSR ratings schemes. For example, KLD 
Analytics, perhaps the oldest and best-known CSR ratings scheme in the United States, includes 
sub-indicators for all the CSR dimensions used in our paper. Similarly, human rights, labor, and 
the environment are major categories of principles of the UN Global Compact, a flagship 
initiative of the global CSR movement.  
 
While several studies have examined how consumers use CSR evaluating platforms like 
GoodGuide (Kampf, 2014; Angeles, 2016), we could not locate studies that analyzed the 
GoodGuide database itself. Nevertheless, we have confidence in the construct validity of 
GoodGuide scores for the following reasons. A survey of CSR experts ranking the credibility of 
various CSR evaluation schemes found that GoodGuide rated more highly than many other well-
known ones such as CROs 100 Best Corporate Citizens, Newsweek Green Rankings, Fortune’s 
Most Admired Companies, Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies, Asset4 ESG Ratings, The 
Bloomberg Sustainability Initiative and MSCI ESG Indices (Globescan, 2012). These results are 
especially reassuring given that the survey was conducted only three years after the launch of 
GoodGuide in 2007, suggesting that the database achieved a high level of credibility in a short 
                                                        
9 The sample size in our models (2,724) is smaller than the number of companies listed in the Goodguide database, 
as many of them have has been assigned policy scores by Goodguide. 
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period of time. As further evidence of construct validity, our own analyses reveal that the 
average of GoodGuide measures across all CSR dimensions is significantly correlated with the 
average CSR scores across all major dimensions in four other global CSR evaluators: 
Newsweek’s Global Green Rankings (where the correlation is .60, p < .01); CSRHub (.67, p < 
.01), FTSE4Good Index (.31; p < .01),10 and Thomson Reuters Asset4 (.89; p < .01). The 
relatively high correlation with Thomson Reuters Asset4 is reassuring, given that this scheme is 
the most explicit among the four in using policy indicators as a component of its overall CSR 
scores. 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Our models include a measure of overall CSR policy extensiveness and several measures of 
extensiveness within particular issue areas. The overall measure is the percentage of all CSR 
policies in the GoodGuide database that have been adopted by a focalized company. The issue-
area measure is the percentage of policies in the GoodGuide database that have been adopted by 
a company within the areas of workers, consumers, human rights, supply chains, and the natural 
environment.11 Because our dependent variables concern only policies, we exclude indicators 
that are not policy-related, for example, “performance-related” indicators such as the poundage 
                                                        
10 The correlation of GoodGuide with FTSE4Good seems relatively lower because the FTSE4Good scheme has 
much less variation as a binary variable for index inclusion. 
11 These issue areas do not include several dimensions of CSR in GoodGuide. The two excluded areas are 
“community,” for which there are too few underlying policy-based indicators, and “management,” whose underlying 
policy-based indicators overlap with human rights, supply chains, and workers dimensions. Also, although 
GoodGuide does not report high-level policy scores for human rights and supply chains, we include these since they 
are major policy dimensions of the database at the intermediate level of granularity. 
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of greenhouse gas emissions.12 GoodGuide assigns a score of 4 to indicate the absence of a 
policy in an issue area and scores higher than 4 to indicate policy presence. As an intermediate 
step, we render these sub-scores in intuitive binary terms by recoding them to 0 for policy 
absence and 1 for policy presence. We then calculate our final extensiveness scores as the 
percentage of policies in the GoodGuide database that exist within the company either overall or 
within a specific policy dimension. GoodGuide seeks to update its indicators of policy presence 
every year.13 Data sources that inform the policy indicators include scientific and government 
agencies, commercial data aggregators, nongovernmental organizations, media content, and 
voluntary company disclosures through platforms like the Carbon Disclosure Project and the 
Global Reporting Initiative, as well as “inter-disciplinary scientific expert panels such as IARC 
(International Agency on the Research of Cancer), governmental agencies such as the European 
Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and other authoritative sources such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the National Toxicology Program (NTP).”14 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
                                                        
12 Because we are concerned only with GoodGuide’s policy-related scores, we did not use the high-level summary 
scores for “Society” and “The Environment,” which are based on many underlying indicators that not policy-related. 
Rather than use existing summary scores, we build our measure of CSR policy extensiveness by aggregating scores 
at the most granular level of the database. The reasons behind our coding treatment can be explored through the 
structure of the database for a given company in our sample, such as Gap Inc., a major clothing retailer, whose 
archived scores are available here: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160324061746/http://www.goodguide.com/companies/547-the-gap-incorporated-
company-reviews-and-ratings. 
13 http://www.goodguide.com/about/methodologies. 
14 https://www.goodguide.com/about/data#/ 
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Each key independent variable in our models is constructed from multiple indicators on the basis 
of data that we gathered either manually or from conventional financial databases, including 
Compustat, Orbis, Capital IQ, and Thomson One. We constructed our key independent variables 
by standardizing the component indicators, adding them, and standardizing the result. We used 
an additive scale rather than, for example, a principal components analysis, because we 
conceived the constituent indicators as unique ways in which businesses can exhibit boundary 
spanning, rather than as correlated measurements of a latent construct. A company with a large 
number of subsidiaries, for example, does not necessarily have a large number of branches, 
although we consider both indicators to increase sub-unit spanning. Each of our computed scales, 
some of whose underlying indicators have been logarithmically transformed,15 highly resembles 
a Gaussian distribution.16 All our results are resistant to the arbitrary deletion of a single 
component indicator of the scales. Whenever possible, we retrieve all variables in such a way as 
to ensure a lag of one year.17 Constructing our key independent variables from multiple 
indicators lessens the potential biases of any single indicator.  
 
Table 1 further details the variables. Sub-unit spanning, for example, is the extent to which a 
firm has multiple divisions, branches, alliances, and historical mergers. We emphasize that sub-
units fall within the ownership umbrella of a company. They may be distinguished, for example, 
                                                        
15 We followed standard statistical practice in logging all variables exhibiting a right skew as evidenced by a visual 
inspection of histograms as well as statistical tests for skewness (e.g., “sktest” in Stata). The logged variables are 
noted in the final column in Table 1. 
16 The distributions are largely symmetrical around zero (a centerpoint that is to be expected since the variables have 
been standardized). Exceptions are “Country CSR,” whose distribution has a large spike for the value of the United 
States, the most represented country in the dataset, and “Business associations,” a count variable whose distribution 
of unlogged values is more Poisson than Gaussian. 
17 Lagging was not possible, for example, where financial databases reported variable values only for the current 
year, such as for the number of companies’ stock exchanges and subsidiaries. For the variables we gathered by hand, 
as well, we were able in many cases to ensure a one-year lag. For example, historical membership in the World 
Economic Forum can be retrieved by consulting archived versions of the forum’s website. 
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from supply chain organizations, which engage in economic exchange with a focalized company 
but are not part of its formal structure. Nation spanning is an index capturing the extent to which 
a firm’s operations are international, with constituent indicators including foreign assets, foreign 
sales, cross-national stock listings and mergers, and the number of overall geographic segments 
by which financial results are broken out.   
 
We included several categories of control variables to capture other forces that may induce CSR 
policy formalization. To control for the prevalence of CSR norms within countries and 
industries, we followed Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) by separately averaging the 
assessed CSR performance, minus the focal company, of companies in the same headquarter 
country and the same two-digit industry of the Standard Industrial Classification scheme. We 
used two leading CSR evaluation schemes for this purpose, namely Thomson Reuters Asset4 and 
CSRHub,18 to avoid the idiosyncrasies of any single scheme and in acknowledgement of ongoing 
debates about the meaning and measurement of CSR (Turker, 2009). We standardized the 
respective scores for each database and averaged the scores of companies across databases. To 
control for the localized “issue-centric” networks (Hoffman, 1999) that may encourage CSR 
engagement, we counted the number of a firm’s memberships in the set of regional and world-
level CSR associations that we identified from global CSR compendia (Grayson, 2007; Visser, 
Matten, Pohl, & Tolhurst, 2010) (see Table 1 for a full listing of these CSR-focused 
associations). Research suggests that CSR-themed business associations are influential in 
mobilizing private-sector resources for charitable programs, initiating business executives into 
                                                        
18 We lack the space to fully review the construction methodologies of these databases but direct our readers to the 
online database handbooks (e.g., Thomson Reuters, 2013) and to previous studies that have utilized these databases 
(e.g., Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015). 
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social responsibility norms, guiding the construction of international certification frameworks 
(Bartley, 2007), and convening annual mega-conferences where executives and 
nongovernmental groups set the international CSR agenda (Pope & Lim, 2017; Galaskiewicz, 
1997). 
 
New institutional theory suggests that, in addition to embeddedness in localized countries, 
industries, or networks, organizations are also embedded in the generalized cultural environment 
(Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). Organizations that are older, larger, or more visible 
may be especially conditioned by broader cultural forces. Established, well endowed, and widely 
known corporations, such as Coca Cola, Nestlé, Ford, or Tata, may be regarded by the general 
public as not merely one business organization among many but as institutional entities in their 
own right, with responsibilities and duties akin to individual citizens and state actors (Gössling & 
Vocht, 2007; Meyer et al., 2015). Therefore, we employ the following controls: age is the logged 
number of years since the firm’s initial public offering (Barnea & Rubin, 2010); size is an index 
of a firm’s assets, earnings, number of employees, and revenues (Burton & Goldsby, 2009); and 
visibility is an index of the number of web traffic to the company’s homepage and Wikipedia 
page, marketing and advertising expenses,19 and branding awards (Brammer & Millington, 
2006).  
 
                                                        
19 Because most companies are not legally required to report advertising and marketing expenditures, the values of 
these variables are missing in more than 70 percent of cases. This missingness is one reason that we created a scale 
variable that includes many other indicators of visibility in addition to advertising and marketing expenditures. The 
main results do not change with alternative techniques detailed by Pope (2018) for dealing with the high levels of 
missingness of advertising and marketing expenditures, such as assigning non-reporters a value of zero, assigning 
companies the industry-level average advertising expenditures, or creating a dummy for whether advertising is 
reported or for appearance in trade-journal lists of top advertisers. 
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Recognizing that CSR policies may be spread through capital markets (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 
2004), with investors, stock exchanges, and financial regulators often pushing public companies 
for greater transparency about their social policies in order to facilitate investment decisions,20 
we control for capital-market exposure with an index of a firm’s number of shareholders, market 
capitalization, coverage by stock analysts, and number of active listings on stock exchanges 
worldwide.21 
 
Finally, cognizant of findings from previous CSR studies (Amato & Amato, 2011), we control 
for slack resources, which may afford companies the flexibility to divert resources to CSR 
activities that may not have immediate, tangible, or easily measured impacts on profitability. 
Slack resources are an index that is higher for firms with low leverage (as indicated by the debt-
to-equity ratio) and more current assets (including cash and assets expected to be converted into 
cash within one year). 
 
Since only 14 percent of our independent variables are missing when aggregated across 
variables, years, and companies, but since many companies do not have full data on all variables, 
we replaced missing values with multiple imputation (Royston, 2004). Table 1 below lists the 
details of variables used in the analysis, including sources, types, and codings. Table 2 presents 
                                                        
20 Our measure of capital-market exposure has not appeared in previous studies and therefore might also be excluded 
here in the interest of taking an approach that is more grounded in the literature. As for our rationale for including 
capital-market exposure as a control variable, one major theory is that companies do CSR because it is profitable. 
Capital markets are thought to discipline companies toward activities that are profitable, which may include CSR. 
Furthermore, unlike privately held companies, companies that are publicly and widely held may face greater 
pressures for transparency and this may lead to the formalization and publication of CSR policies to facilitate arms-
length market exchange by numerous third parties. 
21 Another highly financialized variable that we tested in unreported models was systemic risk as indicated by the 
standard deviation over recent years of returns or GDP within particular industries or countries. One could argue that 
companies will want to avoid CSR policy formalization to retain operational flexibility in times of financial turmoil 
(Bansal, Jiang, and Jung, 2015). We note that this variable yielded insignificant results in our models. 
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descriptive statistics and the Pearson pairwise correlation matrix. Appendix A reports industry 
and headquarter country breakdowns of the sample. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
 
Models 
 
We conducted OLS regressions of the 2,724 companies in our sample with complete data on all 
dependent variables. Formally, multiple linear regression can be represented by the equation yi = 
β0 + β1xi1 + β2xi2 +...+ βpxip + ϵ where y represents the dependent variables in our models related 
to overall and issue-specific policy extensiveness (variables that are described more fully in the 
top of Table 1); x corresponds to the explanatory variables (see the other parts of Table 1); β0 is 
the y-intercept term; βp is the slope coefficient associated with each explanatory variable; ϵ is the 
model’s residual term, and the subscript i denotes specific companies in our dataset. 
 
We added robust standard errors to our models to guard against heteroskedasticity. Visual 
inspection of the histograms of the variables revealed that nearly all resemble a Gaussian 
distribution. Diagnostic tests did not suggest multicollinearity as all variance inflation factors are 
lower than 3, much lower than common rules of thumb. Outliers did not appear to skew the 
results on the basis of Cook’s distance and leverage statistics. The link test for model 
specification produced an insignificant hat squared term in the main model and in nearly all 
robustness checks (p > .05). 
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Results 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our OLS regressions of CSR policy extensiveness on various 
boundary spanning measures. The dependent variable in the first column is the overall 
percentage of CSR policies tracked by GoodGuide that have been adopted by a company and in 
the remaining columns it is the percentage of policies adopted in the specific areas of workers, 
human rights, consumers, the natural environment, and supply chains. All variables in all models 
are standardized to ease comparison of coefficient magnitudes. Coefficients of all controls are 
always in the expected directions (with the exception of capital-market exposure) and are 
oftentimes statistically significant, lending a degree of overall confidence in the validity of the 
results. It is noteworthy that the control variable with the most consistently large effects is 
company visibility, indicated by such components as advertising expenditures and branding 
awards. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  
Controlling for numerous potential confounders, our results show mixed support for our 
hypotheses about the effect of boundary spanning on the overall extensiveness of companies’ 
CSR policies (H1a, H2a, and H3a), but robust support for our hypotheses that link specific forms 
of boundary spanning to the adoption of CSR policies in specific issue areas (H1b, H2b, and 
H3b). Turning to our first hypothesis, the association between sub-unit spanning and CSR policy 
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extensiveness is not positive and significant in Model 1 (predicting overall policy extensiveness) 
or in four of the five remaining models (predicting extensiveness in various policy areas). On 
balance, this result fails to support H1a. Sub-unit spanning, however, does associate with more 
extensive CSR policies in the area of workers. This is consistent with the argument that, 
controlling for other types of boundary spanning, sub-unit spanning provides stronger incentives 
to adopt policies that regulate the behavior of internal actors, but not policies that implicate 
external actors or entities such as consumers, suppliers, or the natural environment. This result 
provides evidence in favor of H1b. As for the interpretation of coefficient magnitudes, an 
increase of a standard deviation in our indicator of sub-unit spanning, for example, associates 
with an increase of about .12 (p <  .01) in the standard deviation in the extensiveness of worker 
policies, which is of a similar magnitude as several other significant coefficients in Model 2a, 
including nation spanning (.14), country CSR (.13), and slack resources (.15). 
 
There is limited support for H2a, as product spanning does not have a significant association 
with overall policy extensiveness (Model 1) nor with policy extensiveness in the majority of 
constituent issue areas (Models 2a, 2b, and 2d), with the exception of consumer and supply chain 
policies (Model 2c and 2e). While we did not anticipate a relationship between product spanning 
and supply chain policies, this relationship is perhaps understandable. A possible rationale is 
that, since companies with wider product portfolios may also have more diverse supply chains, 
these companies may realize greater benefits from standardizing their approaches to supply 
chains through the institution of extensive company-wide policies (Langenberg, Seifert, & 
Tancrez, 2012). Strengthening H2b, product spanning has a positive, significant association with 
consumer CSR policies. This result, as well, suggests that boundary spanning has a positive 
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effect on policy formalization, but one that is confined to the issue area that is likely to be the 
most implicated by the specific type of boundary spanning. In other words, only within the 
implicated issue area may the benefits of policy formalization in the form of identity signaling 
and practice standardization outweigh the potential drawback in the form of reduced operational 
flexibility.  
 
The final type of boundary-spanning that we built hypotheses around is nation spanning. Unlike 
the other types of boundary spanning, nation spanning has a positive, significant association with 
overall CSR policy extensiveness (Model 1). This lends support to H3a. Moreover, nation 
spanning also corresponds with more extensive policy adoption in the issue areas of human 
rights and supply chains (Models 2b and 2e), corroborating H3b. The effect of nation spanning is 
also positive and significant in the issue areas of workers and the environment (Models 2a, 2d), 
but not in the area of consumers (Model 2c). The effects of nation spanning are not only the most 
robust, but also generally the strongest in magnitude as compared to the other types of boundary 
spanning. The only model in which the coefficient of another boundary spanning variable is 
larger is Model 2c, which predicts extensiveness in consumer CSR policies. These overall results 
comport with the argument that nation spanning leads to the adoption of CSR policies as a 
general matter, perhaps due to the increasing status of CSR as an ethical obligation that 
transcends national settings. As CSR has become increasingly institutionalized in the global 
domain, which conspicuously lacks a single governance regime and which continues to retain 
large cross-national differences in economic development and social infrastructure, companies 
that are multinational may find it expedient to formalize CSR policies in a host of issue areas in 
order to increase the social legitimacy of their worldwide operations. 
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Discussion 
 
In this paper, we trained our lens on the extensiveness of CSR policies, proposing that this 
construct is partly governed by the competing demands for organizational control and autonomy. 
We argued that various forms of boundary spanning may shift the calculus in favor of policy 
formalization. Distinguishing three main types of boundary spanning across products, sub-units, 
and nations, we built hypotheses about how these types may increase the extensiveness of CSR 
policies in all issue areas or in several particular ones. Controlling for such factors as company 
size, age, visibility, and slack resources, in addition to country-, industry-, and network-specific 
CSR norms, we found consistent evidence that boundary spanning leads to the formalization of 
CSR policies in the issue areas that are likely to be implicated. Moreover, in the case of nation 
spanning, we found broad effects on policy formalization in nearly all issue areas.  
 
Our conceptual framework was novel in including indicators of both “internal” and “external” 
boundary spanning (Teigland & Wasko, 2003). For internal boundary spanning, we found that 
companies that operate across many sub-units have more CSR policies in the area of workers. 
For external boundary spanning, we found that product spanning, which often entails the 
spanning of consumer segments, associates with a greater degree of formalization of consumer 
CSR policies. We also found that product spanning associates with greater extensiveness in 
supply chain policies, perhaps because the different products involved have diverse supply 
chains that can be better overseen through the formalization of company-wide policies 
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(Langenberg, Seifert, & Tancrez, 2012).22 Finally, we found that nation spanning associates with 
the formalization of policies related to supply chains and human rights, issues that are both 
highly international in scope. Further, we found that nation spanning associates with CSR 
policies in other areas such as workers and the natural environment. The broad observed effects 
of nation spanning suggest a global domain in which multinational corporations are conditioned 
to incorporate CSR in their formal structures as a general matter. 
 
 
Contributions to the CSR and Boundary Spanning Literatures 
 
We contributed to the CSR literature in three primary ways. First, we focalized CSR policies in 
contrast to the usual approach of focalizing CSR practices. We argued that more attention to 
CSR policies is warranted given that they are often signifiers of underlying company practices, 
objects of social movement campaigns, leading indicators of government legislation, and 
components of CSR evaluation schemes that can qualify companies for capital from socially 
responsible investors. We also noted that policies are important objects of management research 
since they can be symbols of the identity and values that an organization wishes to represent 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). While policies are often perceived as technical documents that 
coordinate the internal practices of organizations, they are also cultural artefacts that embody the 
higher ideals that organizations seeks to display to external audiences. 
 
                                                        
22 We thank our anonymous reviewer for highlighting this unexpected finding in our results.  
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Second, we contributed to the CSR literature by analyzing the extensiveness of CSR policies, 
rather than their mere presence or absence. We justified our attention to CSR policy 
extensiveness on the basis of academic conceptualizations of CSR as an umbrella construct that 
encompasses a variety of social issues (Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016). Our attention to CSR policy 
extensiveness was also aligned with the approaches of leading CSR evaluation schemes, which 
consider “CSR performance” to be a composite of the quality of company practices in very 
disparate issue areas (Sethi et al., 2017). Finally, our attention to CSR policy extensiveness 
comported well with the contemporary practice of CSR among companies, which have been 
individually addressing themselves to a range of social issues, causes, and programs. 
Nonetheless, as we noted in the introduction, despite recognition that CSR is conceptually and 
practically a fundamentally multidimensional construct, the extensiveness of companies’ CSR 
policies has been largely neglected in prior research (Heikkurinen & Forsman-Hugg, 2011; 
Yusoff, Mohamad, & Darus, 2013; Sethi, Martell, &  Demir, 2017; Grosbois, 2012).  
 
Third, we added to the CSR literature by introducing the Goodguide database. While we were 
able to locate a few prior studies that predicted whether the Goodguide database would be used 
by consumers (Angeles, 2016) or whether it would change their purchase intentions (Rourke & 
Ringer, 2015), we could not find any studies that used the actual CSR scores from the 
GoodGuide database as key quantitative variables. As a large-sample, longstanding, highly 
granular database that is comprehensive of many CSR issues and whose credibility has been 
confirmed in surveys of CSR practitioners (Globescan, 2012), we considered the almost total 
absence of the GoodGuide database from the quantitative literature to be a serious omission. 
Moreover, we believe that the GoodGuide database is a particularly unique and attractive source 
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of CSR information since it is one of the only databases to our knowledge that publishes 
quantitative assessments specifically related to companies’ CSR policies. 
 
We contributed to research on organizational boundary spanning in two primary ways. First, we 
drew together several sub-literatures that have been developing in isolation, namely, the 
literatures on product, sub-unit, and nation spanning. By combining three different types of 
boundary spanning into a single analytic framework, we drew attention to the conceptual 
similarities among several organizational trends that have been labelled, variously, as product 
diversification, company internationalization, and organizational internal differentiation. While 
emphasizing that these trends have conceptual similarities, we also theorized that they each have 
qualitative differences. For example, we discussed nation spanning as being likely to implicate 
different cultural-institutional environments, whereas product spanning may implicate 
operational domains with very different technical problems that are solved in relation to very 
different consumer segments. We hope that our effort to compare and contrast multiple types of 
organizational boundary spanning will encourage future researchers to approach this very 
common phenomenon as having both particular and general effects upon organizations. 
 
Second, we treated organizational boundary spanning as a potential explanation for CSR, 
particularly for CSR policy extensiveness. Previous research, by contrast, commonly attributes 
CSR policies and practices to company characteristics that are more singular, such as size, age, 
and visibility (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Previous research 
also commonly views CSR as a response to dynamics within a single national, industrial, or 
network-based field (cf. Hoffman, 2001). Our research, however, built on nascent approaches 
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that link CSR involvement to more complex organizational attributes, such as product 
diversification (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) and internationalization (Attig et al, 2016). That 
said, we did not treat all types of boundary spanning as having the same effect on CSR policy 
extensiveness. We argued, rather, that different types of boundary spanning implicate different 
social concerns and therefore may lead to the formalization of extensive CSR policies in 
different social issue areas. 
 
 
Practical and Managerial Implications 
 
Our theory and findings have three main implications for managers who are deliberating on 
whether to extend their CSR policies. First, given that policies serve to control organizational 
practices and that boundary-spanning companies may have a greater need for this control, our 
findings suggest that CSR may be used by companies in ways that are more governance-based as 
compared to the usual research focus on the branding or market-based incentives. If CSR 
policies may be used by managers to improve organizational governance by binding disparate 
sub-units, product divisions, and geographic segments to company-wide stances on multiple 
social issues, this has implications for the pervasive suspicion that CSR policies are mere 
window dressing. As noted in the introductory section, there is now a vocal segment of activists 
and academics who are concerned that companies’ CSR policies are more symbolism than 
substance (Pope and Waeraas 2016). These critics tend to assume that the main benefit of policy-
practice decoupling is an improvement to the company image without a corresponding and 
potentially costly change to the company’s business practices. By contrast, our arguments about 
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how boundary spanning may extend CSR policy adoption have focused on the potential 
improvements in corporate governance that may accrue to managers who make the appropriate 
decision as to integrating disparate divisions or allowing them to retain autonomy. By 
implication, companies that extend CSR policies to improve internal corporate governance may 
have stronger incentives to follow through with implementation than do companies that extend 
CSR policies only to gain image benefits from external stakeholders.  
 
Second, our theory also acknowledges that CSR policies may be useful tools for managers for 
consolidating organizational identity and standardizing organizational practices, activities that 
may be especially relevant for complex organizations. Our focus on the corporate governance 
incentives for CSR policy adoption contrasts with research on the “business case for CSR” that is 
primarily concerned with whether CSR ultimately generates company profits (Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003). Our framework and analyses, rather, highlight nonpecuniary benefits from CSR, 
such as a more unified organizational identity and a more tightly integrated company across 
different sub-unit, product, and national boundaries. While we recognize that better corporate 
governance may ultimately deliver financial returns, we are also aware that the linkages between 
policy formalization, implementation, and financial outcomes may be very difficult for 
researchers to trace and establish (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Moreover, to the extent that 
organizations use CSR policies to signal an overall organizational identity, we recognize that the 
forces at play may be more deeply cultural than financial (Scott, 1995). 
 
Third, our findings suggest that managers, in deciding whether to extend CSR policies, should 
assess the particular types of boundary spanning that characterize their own organizations. For 
 38 
companies spanning sub-units or products, managers may entertain policies that are specifically 
related to workers or consumers, respectively. For companies spanning nations, managers may 
consider adopting CSR policies across a range of issue areas. For managers of these 
organizations, a more omnibus approach to the formalization of CSR concerns into company 
policies may help to secure an international passport to a global domain in which CSR has 
increasingly become a core cultural principle (Aggerholm & Trapp, 2014; Vashchenko, 2017). In 
sum, our theory and findings suggest that CSR policy formalization is not a simple decision, but 
a contingent one in which managers should seek to align the structural characteristics of their 
organizations with CSR policies that address the implicated issue areas. This should enable 
managers to make prudent policy-forming decisions that address stakeholder concerns while not 
going beyond the social issues that are raised by their particular form of organizational 
complexity. 
 
 
Limitations 
  
Our study has several limitations. Although the GoodGuide database afforded a large corporate 
sample, it contained only major consumer goods companies. Findings for these companies, 
which include the majority of global household names, may not generalize well to other samples. 
The GoodGuide database also does not make longitudinal data publicly available with which to 
use additional statistical techniques to support causal inference. For this reason, we have been 
cautious with causal interpretation, and explicitly acknowledge here that the present findings 
would be stronger if confirmed by additional longitudinal, experimental, and qualitative research.  
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Another limitation concerns the validity of the GoodGuide data. As we noted earlier, few studies 
have used the GoodGuide data and only then to examine its use by consumers, not its actual CSR 
scores. While we found reassuring results when we correlated Goodguide’s scores with those 
from well-known CSR evaluators, we recognize that there is still a large need for future 
researchers to perform an extended, dedicated, quantitative analysis of Goodguide’s 
methodology that compares and contrasts it with the approaches taken by evaluators such as 
KLD Analytics, MSCI, and RobecoSAM. Future research could also make a more 
comprehensive use of the Goodguide database than we did in the present paper. Because our 
analytic focus was on policy extensiveness, we were forced to exclude measures of CSR that 
were not policy-related, for example, those that are related to the quality of corporate disclosures 
or the severity of corporate controversies. We recognize, however, that such measures may be of 
great interest to other researchers.   
 
Our paper has been limited also in its ability to test the mechanisms that govern the observed 
relationships between our core constructs. We theorized that some of the mechanisms that link 
organizational boundary spanning to CSR policy extensiveness include the need to control 
business practices, to coalesce an organizational identity, and to signal to disparate geographic 
audiences an organizational commitment to location-independent norms. However, the nature of 
our dataset prevented us from isolating and adjudicating the relative strength of these 
mechanisms. While our dataset was advantageous in allowing us to distinguish three types of 
boundary spanning and five types of CSR policies, it did not afford direct observation of the 
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conceptual pathways that link these variables. Future research to tease out and pinpoint these 
mechanisms is needed. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While corporate social policies may or may not correspond with high quality CSR practices, 
their widespread adoption in recent decades indicates that CSR has become a ubiquitous and 
perhaps even taken-for-granted feature of the contemporary organization, instead of just an ad 
hoc or piecemeal reaction to calls for businesses to engage with social and environmental issues. 
This is a marked shift from previous decades when CSR and corporate social policies were seen 
as fringe behavior that subverted business’ fundamental profit imperative. Offering partial but 
significant explanation for this broad shift, our paper linked the extensiveness of companies’ 
CSR policies to their structural complexity in the form of boundary spanning across sub-units, 
products, and nations. To the extent that even more companies cross national borders, diversify 
their product portfolios, and oversee complex internal systems of sourcing and distribution, we 
would expect CSR policy formalization to increase in prevalence and to expand to cover more 
issue areas.  
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Table 1 
Variables in the Analysis 
 
Variable Source Type Description 
Social policy 
All CSR policies GoodGuide Inc. Score  Percentage of all CSR policies adopted 
Worker policies GoodGuide Inc. Score Percentage of policies adopted categorizable as 
related to workers, e.g., job security policy, labor 
union policy, employee health policy, and 
freedom of association policy, whistleblower 
policy, internal ethics communication policy, and 
business ethics targets policy 
Human rights policies GoodGuide Inc. Score Percentage of policies adopted categorizable as 
related to human rights, e.g., oppressive regime 
policies, indigenous rights policies, and supply 
chain policies targeting indirect impacts on local 
communities 
Consumer policies GoodGuide Inc. Score Percentage of policies adopted categorizable as 
related to consumers, e.g., product quality policy, 
consumer health policy, product access policy, 
and product labelling policy 
Environmental policies GoodGuide Inc. Score Percentage of policies adopted categorizable as 
related to the natural environment, e.g., 
dematerialization policy, resource efficiency 
policy, biodiversity policy, and environmental 
management system policy 
Supply chain policies GoodGuide Inc Score Percentage of policies adopted categorizable as 
related to supply chains, e.g., having an 
environmental criteria for suppliers, having 
supply chain targets, and supplier diveristy 
initiatives 
Boundary spanning 
   
Product spanning    
Business segments Compustat; Orbis Count Business segments reported in annual financial 
statements (log) 
Industry codes Orbis Count Unique 2-digit SIC primary and secondary 
industry codes (log) 
Trademarks Orbis Count Registered trademarks (log) 
Cross-industry M&A 
 
Orbis Count Number of previous completed mergers and 
acquisitions across 2-digit SIC industries in the 
M&A database (log) 
Sub-unit spanning    
Subsidiaries Orbis Count Number of subsidiaries (log) 
Corp. group members Orbis Count Number of corporate group members (log) 
Branches Orbis Count Number of branches (log) 
M&A deals Orbis Count Total historical M&A deals listed as completed in 
Orbis database (log) 
Strategic alliances Capital IQ Count Alliances listed as recent in Capital IQ database 
(log) 
Nation-state spanning    
Geographic segments Compustat; Orbis Count Geographic segments broken out in annual 
financial statements (log) 
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Cross-country M&A Orbis Count Mergers across headquarter countries in the Orbis 
database (log) 
Countries w/ stock listings Orbis Count Unique countries where stock is listed (log) 
Assets foreign Thomson One Percent Foreign assets divided by total assets 
Sales foreign Thomson One Percent Foreign sales divided by total sales 
Controls  
 
  
Industry CSR CSR Hub, Asset4 Score The average of the main CSR scores of CSRHub 
and Asset4 at the most granular level of SIC 
industry with available data for all companies in 
the respective databases in the most recent year, 
minus the focal company 
Country CSR CSR Hub, Asset4 Score The average of the main CSR scores of CSRHub 
and Asset4 at the country level for all companies 
in the respective databases in the most recent 
year, minus the focal company 
Business associations Bus. association 
webpages 
Count The number of memberships in world and world-
regional CSR associations, i.e., Global Compact, 
CSR Europe, CSR Asia, International Business 
Leaders Forum, World Economic Forum, World 
Business Council for Sustainability, Arabia CSR 
Forum, Business Action of Africa, and the 
Business for Social Responsibility (log) 
Age Capital IQ Count Years since initial public offering (log) 
Size    
Assets Compustat; Orbis Continuous Year-end USD assets in millions (log) 
Earnings Compustat; Orbis Continuous Year-end USD earnings in millions (log)  
Employees Compustat; Orbis Count Employees (actual and reported estimates) (log) 
Revenues Compustat; Orbis Continuous Year-end USD revenues in millions (log) 
Visibility    
Wikipedia views Stats.grok.se.com Number Total views globally of the main English 
company Wikipedia page (log) 
Homepage traffic Alexa Internet, Inc. Rank Worldwide corporate homepage traffic rank, 
divided by 1 mm and reverse coded  
Marketing Compustat; 
Thomson One; 
Capital IQ 
Dollars Annual marketing expenses (log) 
Advertising Compustat; 
Thomson One; 
Capital IQ 
Dollars Annual advertising expenses (log) 
Branding awards Various Count Appearances in the Top 100 positions in the most 
recent year of the lists mentioned in the notes of 
this table (log) 
Capital-market exposure 
Shareholders Orbis Count Number of recorded shareholders (log) 
Market capitalization Compustat; Orbis Count Total outstanding shares multiplied by average 
share price over the year (log) 
Stock analysts Orbis Count The number of analysts who cover the stock (log) 
Stock exchanges Orbis Count Active stock exchange listings worldwide (log) 
Slack resources    
Current Assets Compustat; Orbis Continuous Year-end USD cash and assets that are expected 
to converted to cash within one year in millions 
(log) 
Debt / Equity Compustat; Orbis Ratio Total debt divided by total equity 
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Note: GoodGuide, Wikipedia, and Alexa Internet were captured by a web scrape. Branding awards include World’s Most Admired Cos. 
(Fortune); World's Most Reputable Cos. (Forbes); Best Global Brands (Brand Directory); Top 100 Global Brands (BrandZ); Best Global 
Brands (Interbrand); 100 Most Powerful Brands (Tenet Partners and Core Brand); Prestige  Ranking the Brands Top 100 (Syncforce); 
The Future Brand Index Top 100 (Future Brand); Prestige 100 Facebook IQ (L2 Think Tank); World's Most Valuable Brands (Forbes); 
Top Global Marketers (Advertising Age). The human rights variable includes only supply chain policies that are specifically related to 
human rights. GoodGuide, for example, assigns policy scores for whether a company “Uses Human Rights Criteria to Select Suppliers” 
or whether “The Code of Conduct Applies to the Supply Chain.” Similarly, the supply chain variable includes human rights policies 
only if those polices are related to supply chains.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Collinearity Matrix 
No. μ σ Min. Max. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 0.47 0.22 0.00 0.96 All policies       
2 0.62 0.23 0.00 1.00 Worker policies .86*      
3 0.33 0.26 0.00 1.00 Human rights policies .79* .66*     
4 0.46 0.24 0.00 1.00 Consumer policies .76* .58* .49*    
5 0.65 0.40 0.00 1.00 Environment policies .71* .64* .65* .56*   
6 0.48 0.43 0.00 0.97 Suppy chain policies .81* .76* .72* .61* .74*  
7 0.00 1.00 -3.36 4.48 Product spanning .33* .29* .25* .28* .25* .34* 
8 0.00 1.00 -2.61 3.29 Sub-unit spanning .49* .47* .33* .36* .34* .45* 
9 0.00 1.00 -3.32 3.39 Nation-state spanning .33* .31* .32* .13* .28* .33* 
10 4.29 3.95 1.61 6.54 Age (log) .20* .14* .21* .23* .24* .19* 
11 0.00 1.00 -3.25 2.52 Size .33* .28* .21* .29* .26* .29* 
12 0.00 1.00 -7.12 4.87 Visibility .42* .37* .29* .45* .31* .52* 
13 0.00 1.00 -2.21 1.94 Cap.-market exposure .38* .35* .26* .30* .25* .33* 
14 0.23 0.62 0.00 6.00 CSR associations .26* .24* .18* .15* .22* .27* 
15 0.00 1.00 -3.73 3.76 Industry CSR .17* .14* .11* .16* .26* .19* 
16 0.00 1.00 -3.59 3.78 Country CSR .23* .20* .25* .08* .23* .22* 
17 0.00 1.00 -2.30 3.21 Slack resources .21* .24* .16* .07* .24* .22* 
 
Table 2. Collinearity Matrix Continued 
No. Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8 Sub-unit spaning  .53*          
9 Nation-state spanning  .32*  .36*         
10 Age  .24*  .22*  .14*        
11 Size  .39*  .66*  .31*  .23*       
12 Visibility  .56*  .51*  .59* -.08    .65*           
13 Cap.-market embedd.  .44*  .55*  .42*  .05*  .66*  .69*         
14 CSR associations  .24*  .34*  .33*  .12*  .31*  .53*  .28*       
15 Industry CSR  .07*  .03    .08*  .09*  .07*  .08    .06*  .04*     
16 Country CSR  .07*  .14*  .38*  .10*  .00    .09    .12*  .15*  .02     
17 Slack resources  .20*  .32*  .23*  .10*  .45*  .28    .37*  .19*  .10*  .12* 
Note: * p < 0.05; Boundary-spanning and control variables are coded to match their treatment in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
OLS Regressions of Social Policy Scores on measures of Market Embeddedness, Integration, and Social Embeddedness 
 Model 1 
CSR  
policy  
score (avg.) 
Model 2a 
Worker  
policy  
score (avg.) 
Model 2b 
Human rights 
policy score  
(avg.) 
Model 2c 
Consumer  
policy 
score (avg.) 
Model 2d 
Environmental 
policy  
score (avg.) 
Model 2e 
Supply chain 
policy 
score (avg.) 
H1a, H1b Sub-unit spanning 0.03 0.12** 0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
H2a, H2b Product spanning 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05* -0.02 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
H3a, H3b Nation spanning 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.00 0.18*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Industry CSR 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Country CSR 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
CSR Business associations 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.52*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Size 0.16** 0.05 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.10* 
      (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Visibility 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.26*** 0.17*** 0.25*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age (log) 0.07* -0.01 0.06*** 0.06** 0.15*** 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Slack resources 0.04 0.15*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.05* 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Capital-market exposure -0.05 0.02 -0.08* 0.00 -0.09* -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Constant -0.40*** -0.38*** -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.38*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
N 2,724.00 2,724.00 2,724.00 2,724.00 2,724.00 2,724.00 
R² 0.38 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.32 
F-statistic 205.50*** 95.01*** 103.25*** 71.27*** 117.44*** 117.65*** 
       
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. All coefficients standardized. Parenthetic robust standard errors. 
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Appendix A 
 
Notes on composition of sample 
 
By headquarter country using 3-digit ISO country codes (in descending order of number of sample 
companies): 
 
USA (1078), JPN (322), GBR (234), CAN (161), AUS (117), FRA (79), DEU (59), CHE (57), BMU 
(45), SWE (41), ITA (39), ESP (31), SGP (31), HKG (31), NLD (26), IND (26), IRL (25), CHN (24), 
BEL (20), FIN (20), TWN (18), KOR (18), DNK (18), ZAF (17), BRA (15), CYM (15), NOR (15), MYS 
(12), GRC (12), MEX (10), AUT (9), JEY (9), NZL (8), PRT (8), TUR (7), RUS (7), LUX (6), CHL (6), 
ISR (6), THA (3), IDN (2), PAN (2), SAU (2), VGB (2), PHL (2), GGY (1), KWT (1), ARG (1), MUS 
(1), PAK (1), POL (1), CZE (1), PNG (1), CYP (1), BHS (1), MHL (1), EGY (1).  
 
By the 10-sector divisions of the Standard Industrial Classification scheme, in descending order of 
percentage share:  
Manufacturing (40%), Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (18%), Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (12%), Services (9%), Retail Trade (8%), Mining (7%), Wholesale 
Trade (2%), Construction (2%), Public Administration (1%), and Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (0%). 
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